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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee

Case No. 20040225-CA

vs.
JAMES LUIS GEDO
Defendant / Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A CONVICTION OF RESISTING OR
INTERFERING WITH AN OFFICER IN THE DISCHARGE OF DUTY, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether this Court should address the appellant's appeal when the appellant's
brief fails to comply with the briefing requirements of Rule 24 Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
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Standard of Review. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App. 135, ^[8, 47
P.3dl07.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Provo City did not have to
respond to frivolous motions that were filed against the advice of counsel.
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Seaman, 878 F.2d
351(U.S.App.l989).
3. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that Gedo could not submit any of
his own motions.
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Beanian, 878 F.2d
351(U.S.App.l989).
4. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to find that the police officer's
entry onto the property was illegal, and that his continued presence on the property was a
violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights.
Standard of Review. "An appellate court reviews a trial court finding relative to a
person's actual expectation of privacy under a clearly erroneous standard. The appellate
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court reviews the conclusion as to whether society is willing to recognize the individual5s
expectation of privacy as legitimate under a correction of error standard." State v. Holden,
964 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah App. 1998).
5. Whether the officer's alleged use of "deadly force," should provide a remedy
that results in a dismissal similar to the exclusionary rule.
Standard of Review. The appellate review of the appropriate use of legal
conclusions regarding the exclusionary rule is under a "standard of correctness." State v.
Jarman, 1999 UT App 269 \ 4, 987 P.2d 1284.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Provo City Code § 9,10,030 Interfering with Officer in Dishcarge of Duty
It shall be unlawful for any person to do any act which interferes with,
resists, molests or threatens any peace officer within the limits of
Provo City, while in the discharge of his official duties. It shall be
unlawful for any person to resist a lawful arrest whether made by a
peace officer or by a private person. The fact the person being arrested
believes the arrest to be in proper or unlawful shall not be a defense to
a violation of this section if in fact it is a lawful arrest.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court with
the belief that on or about August 9, 2001, James Luis Gedo committed the crimes of
Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1021;
Resisting or Interfering with Officer in the Discharge of Duty, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Provo City Code § 9.10.030; and Assault on a Peace Officer, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. (R. at 00003).
On September 6, 2001, an arraignment was held before Judge Lynn W. Davis.
Gedo was found by the Court to be indigent and Scott P. Card was appointed to represent
Gedo. A pretrial conference was scheduled for October 30, 2001. (R. at 00006, 00005).
At the October 30, 2001, hearing, Scott Card stated he had a conflict representing Gedo in
this case. The court then appointed Gary Chrystler as conflict counsel for Gedo. (R. at
00011-00012). On November 1, 2001, Gedo appeared with attorney Gary Chrystler for a
pretrial conference before Judge Davis. Gedo filed pro se motions with the Court that
were not accepted and he was instructed only to have his counsel file motions. A motion
hearing was scheduled for January 14, 2002. (R. at 00018).
On December 11, 2001, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions
and Request to Submit to Judge for Decision was filed. (R. at 00026). On December 14,
2001, the Court granted Gedo's request and ordered all motions to be filed by January 31,
lr

The charge of Disorderly Conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 was dismissed
prior to the jury trial in this matter.
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2002. The Court continued the hearing previously set for January 14, 2002, to March 4,
2002. (R. at 00029). Gary Chrystler filed motions on behalf of Gedo on January 18, 2002,
and February 21, 2002. These motions were handwritten by Gedo with a cover sheet
which stated the motions were filed at the request of Gedo but against the advice of
counsel. (R. at 00034, 00038).
On March 4, 2002, a Hearing on the Motions was held before Judge Davis. Gedo
failed to appear. Gedo subsequently appeared and signed a new promise to appear on
April 23, 2002. (R. at 00042). On April 23, 2002, Gedo appeared at a Hearing on the
Motions before Judge Davis. Gary Chrystler appeared and requested to withdraw as
conflict counsel, which was allowed by the Court. (R. at 00046).
On May 20, 2002, a Status Hearing was held before Judge Davis. The matter was
heard with new conflict counsel, Laura H. Cabanilla. The matter was reassigned to Judge
Guy R. Burningham in order to consolidate all of Gedo's open cases. (R. at 00055). On
July 2, 2002, a pretrial conference was held and the case set for further proceedings on
August 26, 2002. On August 26, 2002 the Court ordered discovery of police records
involving Gedo for five (5) years prior to the date of the offense. (R. at 00066, 00063).
On October 2, 2002, counsel for Gedo filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, a
Motion in Limine, a Notice of Intention to Offer Statement of Unavailable Witness at
Trial, and a Notice to Submit for Decision.2 (R. at 00071, 00073, 00076, 00087). The
2

The Notice to Submit for Decision was for motions filed through Gedo's counsel
Gary Chrystler; motions that were filed against the advice of counsel.
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prosecution responded to the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion in Limine on
October 24, 2002. (R. at 00094, 00096).
On October 28, 2002, this matter came before Judge Burningham. The Court held
that Gedo's counsel could amend the Motion to Suppress Evidence by filing a more
specific Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine. The matter was scheduled for oral
arguments. (R. at 00099).
On November 22, 2002, Laura Cabanilla filed a Motion to Dismiss, Motion in
Limine, and Notice to Submit for Decision on the motion's filed by Gary Chrystler. (R. at
00107, 00121, 00119). Additionally, Laura Cabanilla filed a Notice to Submit for
Decision regarding Gedo's Notice of Intention to Offer Statement of Unavailable
Witnesses at Trial. On December 12, 2002, the prosecution filed responses to Gedo's
Motion to Dismiss, Motion in Limine, and Notice of Intention to Offer Statements of
Unavailable Witnesses at Trial. (R. at 00127, 00133, 00141).
On December 23, 2002, oral arguments were heard before Judge Burningham.
Gedo's Motion to Dismiss was denied. The Court granted in part the Motion in Liminie
regarding any injuries sustained by Gedo on the night in question, but denied the motion
regarding prior acts, arrests, and/or incidents. (R. at 00146).
On February 13, 2003, March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003, and April 28, 2003,
counsel for Gedo filed packets of numerous motions by Gedo which were filed with a
cover sheet stating that the motions were being filed at the request of Gedo but against the
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advice of counsel. (R. at 00148, 00184, 00205, 00209). Gedo also filed his own motions,
not through counsel, on February 13, 2003 and February 19, 2003.
On February 19, 2003, a hearing was held before Judge Burningham. Provo City
was instructed to file a response to Gedo's motions by March 10, 2003. On March 11,
2003, Provo City filed a response to Gedo's pretrial motions. (R. at 00179).
On March 24, 2003, a law and motion hearing was held before Judge Burningham.
Gedo filed new motions with the court, and his counsel requested that the City respond to
the motions. The City was ordered to respond to the motions according to the rules, but
the court granted the City's motion to continue and allowed more time to respond. (R. at
00182).
On May 12, 2003, a hearing on the motions was held before Judge Burningham.
The motions filed that day by Gedo, as well as all the other motions that were filed
against counsel's advice, were found to be not relevant to the case and stricken without
need for the City to respond. After Gedo waived his right to a speedy trial, the court
granted Gedo's motion for a six (6) month continuance of the matter. Gedo was ordered
not to file any further motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R. at 00228).
On July 21, 2003, the matter came before Judge Burningham on a Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Laura Cabanilla. After entering into an agreement with
Gedo, regarding Gedo's conduct, Laura Cabanilla agreed to stay on as counsel. (R. at
00255-00256).
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A jury trial was held on January 21 and 22, 2004, before Judge Derek P. Pullan.
Gedo was found not guilty of Assault on a Police Officer and guilty of Resisting or
Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty. (R. at 00342-00348). On February 9,
2004, Gedo was sentenced to the statutory maximum for a Class B Misdemeanor, with all
but twenty (20) days of jail suspended. (R at 00381-00382). On March 9, 2004, defendant
filed a timely appeal. (R. at 00402).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges against Gedo
were as follows: The property located at 363 West 800 North, Provo, is a duplex owned
by Dane Kay. The duplex consists of an upstairs residence and a downstairs apartment.
(T.00405:87 at 23-25, T.00405:88 at 1). Gedo was a tenant in the basement apartment.
(T.00405:89 at 22-24). The attached carport is parking for the upstairs residence.
(T.00405:97 at 24). The side patio is also for the upstairs residence.(T.00405:98 at 7-24).
Gedo, who was renting the downstairs apartment, had no authority or control over the
carport or side patio areas. (T.00405:111 at 9-24).
On the morning of August 9, 2001, the upstairs residence was to be vacant.
(T.00405:90 at 2). Dane Kay, the owner of the property, testified that two Russians,
Sergeia and Dennis, had been sleeping in the upstairs residence at night without his
permission. (T.00405:90 at 20-25 to T.00405:91 at 1-25). After four or five conversations
regarding the Russians sleeping in the upstairs residence, Dane Kay told the Russians
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again that they needed to sleep somewhere else because he was getting the residence
ready to rent. Dane Kay secured the residence and told the Russians that the residence
was locked up and he expected to not see them around anymore. (T.00405:92 at 1-14).
When Dane Kay came back to the residence in the afternoon of August 9, 2001, he
noticed that there had been forced entry into the upstairs residence with damage.
(T.00405:92 at 14-17).
Dane Kay testified that Sergeia and Gedo were at the property on August 9, 2001.
Dane Kay told Sergeia that if he was at the property anymore he would call the police.
(T.00405:93 at 9-18). Dane Kay also told Gedo that if the Russians were there that night
he was going to call the police. (T.00405:93 at 20-22).
Dane Kay testified that he called his brother, Stacey Kay, between 10:00 and 10:30
p.m. and asked him to drive by the property to see if the Russians were there. (T.00405:95
at 14-22). Stacey Kay called Dane Kay back indicating that the two Russians were at the
residence. With this information Dane Kay called the police and gave detailed
information stating that Sergeia and Dennis were trespassing. (T.00405:95 at 21-25,
T.00405:96 at 1-21, T.00405:109 at 17-20).
Officer Rich Bunderson testified that on August 9, 2001, at approximately 11:00
p.m., he was dispatched to 363 West 800 North, Provo, to investigate a complaint of two
males on the east side of the home on the patio. They had been asked to leave the
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property and they would not. (T.00405:121 at 11-22). Officer Bunderson assumed the
complainant lived at the location. (T.00405:122 at 25, R.00405:123 at 1-2). Officer
Bunderson parked his vehicle about half a block east of the residence on the opposite
side of the street. (T.00405:123 at 20-22).
Officer Bunderson proceeded to the front door of the upstairs residence to speak
with the complainant whom he believed lived at the residence. As he proceeded up the
driveway to cut across the lawn to the front door, he shined his flashlight through the
carport to the patio area where he believed the trespassers were located. (T.00405:126 at
11-19. T.00405:128 at 5-14).
Officer Bunderson testified that when he was about five to ten feet up the
driveway on his way to the front door of the upstairs residence (T.00405:131 at 1-12) he
heard a voice start yelling vulgarities at him from the area where he shined his flashlight
on the two males. (T.00405:128 at 19-20, T.00405:129 at 1-2, T.00405:131at 8). The
individual yelling was Gedo. Officer Bunderson stopped and saw Gedo coming around
the side of the house quickly walking toward him and still yelling. (T.00405:130 at 1525). Gedo continued to yell at Officer Bunderson with vulgar language telling him to get
out of there and off the property. Officer Bunderson testified that he tried to explain to
Gedo that he was a police officer and the reason he was called to the property.
(T.00405:131 at 17-23).
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Officer Bunderson testified that Gedo continued yelling at him and that Gedo
quickly approached Officer Bunderson with his hand outstretched toward Officer
Bunderson. Gedo came close enough to the officer that if the officer had not moved Gedo
would have pushed him with his outstretched hand. Officer Bunderson took a step back
and hit Gedo's hand away so Gedo would not push him. (T.00405:132 13-18).
Gedo continued to yell vulgarity at the officer and suddenly put his right hand
behind his back as though he was reaching for something. Officer Bunderson testified
that he was in fear that Gedo was reaching for a weapon. Officer Bunderson reached for
his weapon and drew it out of his holster. Officer Bunderson told Gedo to bring his hand
out in front of him so he could see his hand. (T.00405:134 at 9-24). After several requests
from Officer Bunderson to bring his hand out, Gedo flung both his hands forward in a
threatening aggressive manner. Officer Bunderson observed that Gedo did not have a
weapon, just keys. The officer holstered his weapon and got out his pepper spray.
(T.00405:135atl-21).
Officer Bunderson testified that he again tried to calm Gedo down to explain his
reason for being at the property and that he was called by the owner. Officer Bunderson
stated that Gedo continued yelling so that the officer could not conduct an investigation.
(T.00405:136 at 13-24). Officer Bunderson decided he needed to take Gedo into custody
for impeding his investigation, assault, and disorderly conduct. (T.00405:137 at 15-18).
Gedo continued to yell at the officer to leave or there would be big problems. Gedo
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turned and started walking toward the back part of the carport. Officer Bunderson,
knowing there was another person in the back area of the carport, reached out and
attempted to arrest Gedo by grabbing his left elbow. Gedo forcefully swung around, made
contact with Officer Bunderson, took an aggressive stance, and yelled, "Come on let's
go." Officer Bunderson took this as a call for him to fight so Officer Bunderson sprayed
Gedo in the face with pepper spray. (T.00405:138 at 19-25, T. 00405:139 atl-6, T.00405:
140 at 10-12). Officer Bunderson then reached out, grabbed Gedo by the shoulders and
took Gedo to the ground where he hoped to handcuff him and control him. (T.00405: 141
at 16-21). During this struggle, Gedo and Officer Bunderson ended up in an area between
the carport and side patio. (T.00405:142 at 7-10). Officer Bunderson testified that at some
point during the altercation he called for back up units to respond immediately.
(T.00405:139 at 16-22).
Officer Peterson arrived to assist Officer Bunderson who was still struggling to
handcuff Gedo and gain control of the situation. After several minutes of struggling with
Gedo, the officers were unable to control him. During the struggle, Officer Petersen saw
Gedo attempt to strike Officer Bunderson. Officer Peterson then struck Gedo once in the
back of the head with a closed fist while holding a small utility belt flashlight. Officer
Peterson testified that he felt his knuckles make contact with Gedo's head and that it was
possible the edge of the flashlight he was holding also made contact with Gedo's head.
During the trial, it was stipulated that if Dr. Keith Hooker was called to testify that
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Gedo's injury was consistent with a hard object having struck the defendant. The officers
were then able to gain control of Gedo and handcuff him. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47
at 1-13, T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25).
After arresting Gedo, Officer Bunderson was able to continue his investigation of
the trespassing. In speaking with the property owner's brother, Stacey Kay, who arrived
after Gedo was arrested, Officer Bunderson determined that Gedo lived in the basement
apartment; that there were actually two additional males on the side patio with Gedo, and
that the two males were the Russians that had been previously trespassed from the
property by the owner. The Russians were given a formal trespass warning stating that if
they came back to the property they would be issued citations or arrested. (T.00405:149 at
20-25, T.00405: 150 at 1-5).
The paramedics, responding to Officer Bunderson5s request, arrived and attempted
to treat Gedo. Gedo was aggressive with the paramedics, he was taken to the hospital for
possible treatment, and then transported to the county jail. (T. 00405:150 at 6-10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury found Gedo guilty of violating Provo City Code § 9.10.030, Resisting or
Interfering with Officer in Discharge of Duty, a Class B misdemeanor. Gedo challenges
the verdict and appeals for dismissal of the charge.
Gedo's brief is inadequate and not in compliance with Utah R. App. P. Rule 24.
Gedo's brief does not contain citations to the record on appeal or provide a standard of
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appellate review with supporting authority in the Statement of the Issues Presented for
Review.
The City is not required to respond to motions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which do not apply to this case. This is a criminal case and the URCrP Rule 12
governs in this case.
The trial court did not commit an error that violated Gedo's constitutional rights by
not allowing Gedo to file his own motions. The court has the authority to make
appropriate orders to regulate the conduct of the parties in proceedings. Gedo chose to
exercise his mutually exclusive right to the assistance of counsel in this criminal
proceeding. His attorney had ultimate control over the tools used to accomplish trial
objectives.
There was no violation of Gedo's Fourth Amendment right to be free of an
unreasonable search and seizure. The police officer had a duty to respond to the
complaint of trespassing and was legally on the property attempting to fulfill his duty
when he was confronted by Gedo. Gedo fails to establish any prejudice to his own
constitutional rights.
The exclusionary rule does not provide a remedy for Gedo. The prime purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct in the realm of search and
seizures. Gedo has misinterpreted the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, there
are no findings that the police officers used deadly or excessive force in effecting the
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arrest of Gedo. Gedo was the aggressor throughout the incident. Gedo interfered with and
resisted the officers while in the discharge of their duties.
ARGUMENT
L

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH RULE 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are

not adequately briefed... .When considering arguments on appeal, we look to the
requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an appellant has adequately briefed the
issue. Rule 24 requires that an appellant's brief contain [a] statement of the issues
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved
in the trial court. . . . In addition, this rule requires that the 'argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including
the ground for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.'" State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App.
135,ffl[8,9,47P.3 107.
"[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing
requirements sufficiently to 'enable us to understand . . . what particular errors were
allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under applicable
authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.'" Burns v.
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Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,199 (Utah App. 1996); see also State v. Garner, 2002 UT
App. 234, | 8 , 52 P.3d 467.
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) states that "[t]he statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statement of the facts and references to proceeding below shall be supported by citations
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Under Utah R. App. P. Rule
24(e) "[rjeferences shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 11(b).. . ." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e).
"When an appellant's argument contains no citations to the record and no legal
authority, a court declines to reach the issues." Utah v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App.
1992). Gedo fails to support his arguments with citations to the record or with any legal
analysis or authority. In Gedo's entire brief only two cases are used to support the issues
in the brief or provide any meaningful analysis to his argument.
Gedo's brief fails to comply with several of the briefing requirements of Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The brief does not contain citations to the
record on appeal. Additionally, the brief fails to provide a standard of appellate review
with supporting authority in the statement of the issues presented for review and does not
provide legal analysis or authority to support all of the issues in his brief.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT PROVO
CITY DID NOT HAVE TO RESPOND TO FRIVOLOUS MOTIONS FILED
AGAINST THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL

A.

Counsel for Gedo has not adequately briefed this issue.
"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent

authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988).
In this case, Gedo has not adequately briefed the issue in Point One of his brief
(Aplt. Brf. at 17), and this Court should not address it. In Point I of Gedo's brief, Gedo
cites to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which do not apply to this case. (Aplt. Brf. at
17). This is a criminal case and the URCrP Rule 12 for motions governs. URCrP Rule
12(a) states that u[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which,
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule.
A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the ground upon which it is made
and relief sought. . . ." There is no language in URCrP Rule 12 that obligates the
prosecutor to respond to motions.
B.

Court has authority to control proceedings.
Courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before

it or its officers .. .[and] to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5)). Furthermore,
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URCrP Rule 33 states, "[t]he court may make appropriate orders regulating the conduct
of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any
proceeding." (emphasis added). Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham,
having considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all
the other motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the
City need not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered
Gedo not to file any more motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R at 00228).
The mere fact that Gedo received an unfavorable result in the trial court does not
give rise to the conclusion that the trial court erred when it did not require the prosecution
to respond to the many frivolous motions filed by Gedo. "To establish prejudice, it is not
enough to claim that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or
could have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability5 exists that,
but for .. . error, the result would have been different. 'Reasonable probability is defined
as that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict.'" State v.
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70,76 (Utah App. 1989). URCrP Rule 30(a) states that "[a]ny error,
effect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall
be disregarded."
In this case, if Provo City responded to the many motion's filed by Gedo, Provo
City would have opposed the motions setting forth reasons the motions should be denied.
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Provo City agreed with the court's decision that the motions and any responses to the
motions would not have changed the outcome. Gedo has not established that he was
prejudiced by the court's decision not to consider any pro se motions and has failed to
show that a reasonable probability existed that if all the frivolous motions filed by the
defendant to the trial court were responded to by the prosecution that the outcome would
have been different.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED GEDO
NOT TO SUBMIT ANY OF HIS OWN MOTIONS
In POINT II of Gedo's brief, Gedo alleges that the trial court should have allowed

him to file his own motions with the court; motions not filed by his attorney. Gedo argues
that not allowing him to file these motions was an infringement of his constitutional
rights. (Aplt.Brf.at21).
Right to assistance of counsel is mutually exclusive.
"The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees each criminal
defendant the right to assistance of counsel." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 f 15, 979 P.2d
799 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987)). It is well established that
the Sixth Amendment also grants an accused the fundamental right to defend him- or
herself in person. Id. at \ 15 (quoting Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 818-21, 45
L.ed. 2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975)); Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 & n.6.; State v.
Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1987). These mutually exclusive rights must be

-19-

construed in harmony with each other as far as possible." Id. at f 15 (See Faretta, All
U.S. at 820-21) (emphasis added).
In this case, Gedo chose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel in his
criminal proceeding and the "attorney has ultimate control over the means used to
accomplish trial objective." State v. Valenica, 2001 UT App 159, 1J16, 27 P.3d 573.3 The
defendant's counsel is not an assistant. "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment,
shall be an aide to a willing defendant.... In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a
master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which
the [Sixth] Amendment insists. It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer
manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to
make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas." Faretta v. California, All U.S.
806; 95 S.Ct 2525 at 817.
Gedo prepared numerous handwritten, unintelligible motions with no viable
argument that dealt with the issues in the case and had no basis of law to respond to.
Gedo requested that his attorney submit these frivolous motions and Gary Chrystler did so

3

In State v. Valencia, 2001 UT 15, 27 P.3d 573, the appellant argued that the trial
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to appoint substitute
counsel. The appellant, in one of his arguments on the issues, complains that counsel
would not file discovery motions or a motion to suppress at his request. The court found
that the attorney had ultimate control over the means used to accomplish trial objectives.
Counsel was under no obligation to comply with appellant's desire because motions are a
means used to accomplish trial objectives.
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on January 18, 2002, and February 21, 2002, with a cover sheet which stated the motions
were filed at the request of Gedo but against the advice of counsel (R. at 00034, 00038)
and Laura Cabanilla again on February 13, 2003, March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003, and
April 28, 2003. (R. at 00148, 00184, 00205, 00209). Gedo also filed his own motions, not
through counsel, on February 13, 2003, and February 19, 2003.
In this case, the trial court did not violate Gedo's constitutional rights when the
court clerks instructed the defendant to file motions through counsel (R. at 00018) or
when Judge Burningham ordered Gedo not to file any further motions that were against
the advice of counsel. (R. at 00228). Gedo has not established that he was prejudiced by
the court's decision not to consider any pro se motions. He has not identified what the
those motions would have been and has not established that they would have prevailed.
As stated previously, the courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly
conduct of proceedings before it or its officers . . .[and] to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-75(3)(5)). Furthermore, URCrP Rule 33 states "[t]he court may make appropriate orders
regulating the conduct of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the
conduct of any proceeding." Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham, having
considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all the other
motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the City need
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not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered Gedo not
to file any motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R at 00228).
IV.

THE POLICE OFFICER'S ENTRY ONTO THE PROPERTY WAS LEGAL
AND THE OFFICER'S CONTINUED PRESENCE ON THE PRIVATE
PROPERTY DID NOT VIOLATE GEDO'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS

Utah Code Ann.§ 53-13-103(l)(a) states that a law enforcement officer's "primary
and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement
of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) Police officers - authority, states that u[w]ithin the boundaries
of the municipality, police officers have the same authority to preserve the public peace,
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and property,
remove nuisances existing in the public streets, road, and highways, enforce every law
relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform all the duties required of them by
ordinance or resolution."
In this case, there was no violation of Gedo's Fourth Amendment right to be free
of an unreasonable search and seizure. In his capacity as a community caretaker, Officer
Bunderson entered the properly legally in response to a call from the owner of the
property that two people were trespassing and that they were located on the patio on the
east side of his home. (T.00405:121 at 11-22). It was within Officer Bunderson's duty
and scope of authority to respond to this residence.
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that an "open pathway to the front door was an
implied invitation to members of the public to enter thereon." State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d
1056, 1058 (Utah App. 1992). Officer Bunderson was lawfully on a pathway to the front
door when he shined his flashlight in the carport patio area where people were reported to
be. (T.00405:126 at 11-19. T.00405:128 at 5-14). When Gedo approached Officer
Bunderson from the side patio area, the officer did not know the owner did not live there
and that Gedo was a renter of the downstairs apartment. The officer had no knowledge
whether Gedo was a trespasser. (T.00405:122 at 22, T.00405:123 at 1-15). Gedo did not
give Officer Bunderson a chance to explain why he was there or to find out who he was.
Gedo instantly engaged in threatening and disorderly behavior toward Officer Bunderson.
(T.00405:131 at 17-23) (T.00405:136 at 13-24).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees, "The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.5 The Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of 'their
persons [and] houses' and thus indicates that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right
that must be invoked by an individual." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83; 119 S. Ct. 469
(U.S. 1998) at 88. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. But to the extent
to which the Fourth amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.
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The capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place." Id. at 89.
"[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must
demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and
that his expectation is reasonable,....'" Id. at 83.
Common areas that are shared by other tenants in an apartment house are not
under the exclusive control of one individual so as to create a legitimate expectation of
privacy. "A person's house is specifically identified as a constitutionally protected area
and is without question,... accorded the full range of fourth amendment protections. The
reasonable presumption of an expectation of privacy in ones home, however, does not
extend automatically to open parking lots shared by tenants [common areas] of an
apartment house

" State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1992).

In this case, Gedo fails to establish any prejudice to his own constitutional rights
because he was not a person aggrieved by the alleged unlawful entry or search and
seizure. Gedo had no expectation of privacy in the carport or patio where the altercation
with Officer Bunderson and other police officers took place and had no authority to tell
the officer to leave. The property located at 363 West 800 North, Provo, is a duplex
owned by Dane Kay. The duplex consists of an upstairs residence and a downstairs
apartment. (T.00405:87 at 23-25, T.00405:88 at 1). At the time of the incident, the
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upstairs residence was vacant and Gedo was a tenant in the basement apartment.
(T.00405:89 at 22-24). The carport is parking for the upstairs residence. (T.00405:97 at
24). The patio is also for the upstairs residence. (T.00405:98 at 7-24). Gedo who was
renting the downstairs apartment had no authority or control over the carport or side patio.
(T.00405:111 at 9-24). Dane Kay, the owner of the property, had authority and control
over the vacant upstairs residence, the carport, and the adjoining side patio. Dane Kay, the
owner of the property, requested that officers respond and investigate trespassers on his
property.
Furthermore, the side patio and carport are common areas of the property. If Gedo
shared those common areas with other tenants he would have no legitimate expectation of
privacy in these areas.
V.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
RENDERS WRONGFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
AND DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, RESULT IN A CASE BEING DISMISSED

A. Exclusionary rule as a remedy for Gedo is not appropriate.
In Point IV of Gedo5s brief, Gedo suggests that the exclusionary rule results in
dismissal of charges. Gedo alleges that the "purpose of the exclusionary rule has been to
provide a remedy for a person when police misconduct has been such that it would be
unfair for the prosecution to profit from the misconduct or illegally seized evidence and
use it against the defendant, and it was intended as public policy, to effect a remedy other
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than the ability to sue civilly for money damages." Gedo (Aplt. Brf at 29). Gedo has
misinterpreted the purpose of the exclusionary rule in this case.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to punish police for unlawful search
and seizures but to deter police from unlawful search and seizures. "The prime purpose of
the exclusionary rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police conduct. The
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect." State v. Zieglemean, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App.
1995). "The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and
derivative (the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's
constitutional statutory rights. Courts view the exclusionary rule as a necessary deterrent
to unlawful police behavior, one which prevents the police from benefitting from their
illegalities." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30; \ 1162, 76 P.3d 1159.
"[T]he exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right per se, but rather a judicially
created mechanism to deter unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Jarman, 1999
UT App 269, \ 6, 987 P.2d 1284. Also, the legislature has made law that "[w]hen any
wire, electronic, or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of
the communication and no evidence derived from it may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political
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subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter." (Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7)
In this case, Gedo alleges that this case should be referred back to the trial court
for findings that police misconduct occurred. And that the Court should find that the
exclusionary rule or a dismissal of charges is appropriate as a deterrent to police
misconduct. (Applt. Brf. at 30-31).
In this case, there has been no illegally seized evidence where the exclusionary rule
would come into play as a deterrent to police misconduct in the realm of illegal search
and seizures. Furthermore, there are no factual findings from the court that when Officer
Peterson struck Gedo once in the back of the head with a closed fist while holding a
flashlight that police misconduct occurred. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47 at 1-13,
T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25). Gedo has no grounds to suggest and offers no
authority to support the use of the exclusionary rule to have charges dismissed as a
remedy to a perceived misconduct.
B. The alleged use of "deadly force55 by police to effect Gedo's arrest is unfounded.
Gedo further purposes that a dismissal of the charge would be appropriate as a
deterrent to police misconduct as it relates to his arrest. In this case, Gedo alleges that the
police used "deadly force" when trying to lawfully arrest Gedo and the remedy for Gedo
would be a dismissal of the charge. (Aplt. Brf. at 31).
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In this case, the police officers used reasonable force in order to get Gedo under
control and to arrest him. There are no factual findings that the police used excessive or
deadly force in their efforts to arrest Gedo who was resisting and interfering with the
officers in the discharge of their duties.
According to Utah case law, "deadly force is force which is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury." State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1996). Serious bodily
injury means "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement,
protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or creates a
substantial risk of death." State in the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, Jr., a person
less than eighteen years of age, 568 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7 states, "[i]f a person is being arrested and flees or
forcibly resists after being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person
arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest." "[A] person may not lawfully
resist an arrest initiated by a peace officer taken within the course of the officer's duties.
Where the officer is not acting wholly outside the scope of his or her authority, the police
action may not be resisted." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App.
1996).4
4

In Smoot, the defendant was told by police that they were going to place him
under arrest for his outstanding warrants. The defendant tried to flee when the officer
tried to effect an arrest. The officer grabbed the defendant and pulled him to the ground.
The defendant continued to struggle and kept pushing up, attempting to escape. Finally,
unable to subdue the defendant the officer struck the defendant in the head two or three
times, at which point the defendant stopped struggling and allowed himself to be
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In this case, the officer did not use excessive or deadly force to effect the arrest of
Gedo. The facts show that Gedo was the aggressor and was resisting arrest. Officer
Bunderson was at the property pursuing an investigation of trespassing. (T.00405: 121
atl8-22). Gedo approached Officer Bunderson in an aggressive manner yelling at the
officer. Officer Bunderson tried to explain to Gedo his reason for being on the property.
Gedo continued to yell and be aggressive with the officer. (T. 00405: 131-139). Gedo
was out of control and engaged in a physical altercation with Officer Bunderson. (T.
00405: at 138-146). Officer Peterson arrived to assist Officer Bunderson who was still
struggling to handcuff Gedo and gain control of the situation. After several minutes of
struggling with Gedo, the officers were unable to control him. During the struggle,
Officer Petersen saw Gedo attempt to strike Officer Bunderson, whereupon Officer
Peterson struck Gedo once in the back of the head with a closed fist while holding a small

handcuffed.
The defendant's proposed jury instructions dealt with his alleged right to resist
arrest when the police use excessive force. The trial judge refused to submit the
defendant's jury instructions stating that a person may lawfully resist an arrest initiated by
a peace officer taken within the course of the officer's duties. The defendant, in his
appeal challenged the trial judge's decision that the defendant's proposed jury
instructions did not accurately state the applicable law.
The Appellate Court concluded that u[w] here the officer is not acting wholly
outside the scope of his or her authority, the police action may not be resisted." The
Appellate Court found the trial court did not error in finding that the force used by the
police was "not excessive" and "reasonable" in view of the circumstances. The Court
found that there was no indication in the case that the police were doing anything other
than diligently pursuing an official police investigation, that the defendant was the
aggressor in the situation, and the police used reasonable force to effect the arrest of a
person resisting.
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utility belt flashlight. Officer Peterson testified that he felt his knuckles make contact
with Gedo's head and that it was possible the edge of the flashlight he was holding also
made contact with Gedo's head. During the trial, it was stipulated that if Dr. Keith
Hooker was called to testify that Gedo's injury was consistent with a hard object having
struck the defendant. The officers were then able to gain control of Gedo and handcuff
him. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47 at 1-13, T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25).
In sum, Gedo's challenges presented in his brief do not present a basis to allow for
any remedies or dismissal of the charge of Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of
Duty.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
verdict finding Gedo guilty of Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty.

DATED this 20^

day of June, 2005.

STEPHEN H. SCHREINER
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
RULES
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7)
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e)
URCrP Rule 12
URCrP Rule 30(a)
URCrP Rule 33
STATE STATUES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1)
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(10)(a)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5-(3)(5)
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RULES
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7)
The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the
issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of the facts and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e)
References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed
statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover pages of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right comer and each separately numbered
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber.
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
URCrP Rule 12
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which,
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule.
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A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made
and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless
required by the court.
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for
decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned "Request to Submit for
Decision.ff The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion
was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, including
request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion.
(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceeding;
(B) motions to suppress evidence;
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(C) requests for discovery where allowed;
(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or.
(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah
Code Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date of
sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entry of
conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to Utah Code Section
76-3-402 may be raised at any time after sentencing upon proper service of the motion on
the appropriate prosecuting entity.
(d) Motions to suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall:
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;
(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and.
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them.
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by the
non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and at
the hearing.
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(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues
are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
(g) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at
the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are
made orally.
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued
for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information.
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of
limitations.
URCrP Rule 30(a)
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.
URCrP Rule 33
The court may make appropriate order regulating the conduct of officers, parties,
spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any proceeding.
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STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1)
(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the same
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to preserve the public
peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and
property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets, roads, and highways, enforce
every law relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required of them
by ordinance or resolution.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(l)(a)
"Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer who is an
employee of a law enforcement agency that is part of or administered by the state or any
of it political subdivisions, and whose primary and principal duties consist of the
prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances
of this state, or any of its political subdivisions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed of the
intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable force to effect the
arrest...
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7
When any wire, electronic, or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of the communication and no evidence derived from it may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the state, or a political subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that information would
be in violation of this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5)
Every court has authority to:
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of
all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every
matter;
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